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Abstract
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) is going to be an emerging wireless technology for
the future. With the increasing popularity of Broadband internet, wireless networking market is thriving.
Wireless network is not fully secure due to rapid release of new technologies, market competition and lack of
physical infrastructure. In the IEEE 802.11 technology, security was added later. Iin IEEE 802.16, security has
been considered as the main issue during the design of the protocol. However, security mechanism of the IEEE
802.16 (WiMAX) still remains a question. WiMAX is relatively a new technology; not deployed widely to justify
the evidence of threats, risk and vulnerability in real situations. This paper will address the security aspects of
the IEEE 802.16 Standard and point out the security vulnerabilities, threats and risks associated with this
standard.
Keywords: authentication, authorization, base station, connections, encryption, IEEE 802.16, methods, mobile
station, subscriber station, security, standards, WiMAX.

INTRODUCTION
IEEE 802.16 is the Standard to state the radio frequency of fixed Broadband Wireless Access (BWA).WiMAX is
the trade name of “IEEE 802.16 Standard”. IEEE 802.16 was first planned to offer the last mile for Wireless
Metropolitan Area Network (WMAN) with the line of sight (LOS) of 30 – 50 km. It was designed to facilitate
WISP’s Backhaul, Broadband internet connectivity to proprietary and standardsbased WiFi mesh networks,
hotspots, residences and businesses. It is featured with QoS for Voice and Video, realtime video conferencing
and other services with up to 280 Mbps per base stations. Revised Standard 802.162004 provide extended
support for nonlineofsight (NLOS) in 211GHz spectrum with mesh connections for both fixed and nomadic
users. Lastest IEEE 802.16e Standard, released on February 28, 2006 intends to facilitate mobility in 26GHz
spectrum within a range of 2  5 km. It is expected to provide true broadband for roaming users, which enables
the creation of a ‘CPEless’ broadband internet, and facilitate access to broadband internet connection for laptops
and PDAs with integrated WiMAX technology. Industry experts are forecasting that WiMAX will strengthen
business competition between Telecomm industries (GMS, CDMA) and cable broadband companies. Moreover,
WiMAX hotspots (IEEE 802.16e) are more likely to replace WiFi hotspots (Patton et al, 2004).

METHODS
The IEEE 802.16 standard is still “on paper” and some methods are under development. Time and scope are the
constraints for this paper. Therefore, research has been done based on published materials, literature & journal
study, and IEEE publications and mostly from website; however references has been provided wherever
necessary. To understand the security aspects of IEEE 802.16 technology, it is required to provide an overview of
this standard as a relevant work. In this paper, only MAC and Physical layer of the standard has been discussed
shortly. “WiMAX” and “IEEE 802.16 standard” will be used as synonyms.

IEEE 802.16 PROTOCOL LAYER
Physical Layer
WiMAX uses OFDM technology. Orthogonal frequencydivision multiplexing (OFDM) allows assigning sub
carriers to different users. It is resilient to multipath that helps to overcome multiple signals hitting the receiver.

In IEEE 802.162004 standard, the OFDM signal is divided into 256 carriers and IEEE 802.16e will use Scalable
OFDMA. The IEEE 802.16 standard supports wide range of frequencies and the physical layer contains several
forms of modulation and multiplexing (Boom, 2004). The modulation methods in the downlink (DL) and uplink
(UL) are binary phase shift keying (BPSK), quaternary PSK (QPSK), 16quadrature amplitude modulation
(QAM), and 64QAM.

Figure 1: IEEE 802.16 Protocol Layer (IEEE, 2004)
The IEEE 802.16 supports two types of transmission duplexing: Time Division Duplexing (TDD) and Frequency
Division Duplexing (FDD) and support both full and half duplex stations. TDD framing is adaptive, it has a
fixed duration, which consists of one Uplink and one Downlink frame. BS sends the complete downlink
subframe (DLMAP, ULMAP). Both Up and Down link transmission share same frequency but are separated
on time. In FDD, while transmissions are still scheduled by DLMAP and ULMAP, uplink and downlink
communications take place at the same time, but on different frequencies (Boom, 2004). Some device
manufacturers produce, devices operating in unlicensed frequency bands which will use timedivision duplexing
(TDD) and devices using licensed frequency bands which uses either TDD or frequencydivision duplexing
(FDD) (INTEL, 2006).
Frame duration can be set to 0.5, 1 or 2 milliseconds. In TDD, the portion allocated for the downlink and portion
allocated to the uplink may vary. The Uplink is time division multiple access (TDMA) where bandwidth is split
into time slots. Each time slot is allocated to an individual MS being served by the BS. A downlink sub frame
contains two parts. One part is for control information, which holds preamble for frame synchronization & maps
and the other contains data. A Downlink map states the starting position and transmission attributes of the data
bursts. An Uplink map states the allocation of the bandwidth to mobile station (MS) for their communication
(Barbeau, 2005).

IEEE 802.16 MAC
802.16 MAC is connection oriented. The MAC Layer of IEEE 802.16 was designed for point to multipoint
(PMP) broadband wireless access applications (IEEE, 2004). IEEE 802.16 standard is made up of a protocol
stack with properly defined interfaces. There is a Base Station (BS) as the Access Points in 802.11 and several
Subscribers Stations (SS). BS is basically wired, and it broadcasts to the Subsciber Stations (SS). In contrast to
802.11 CSMA/CA method, 802.16 uses Uplink and Downlink maps to confirm collision free access. SS uses
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) to share the uplink, while BS uses TDM (Time Division Multiplexing).
All these functions are done through ULMAP and DLMAP messages (Aikaterini, 2004).
MAC layer consists of three sub layers. Service Specific Convergence Sublayer (MAC CS), the MAC Common
Part Sublayer (MAC CPS) and the privacy sublayer. The MAC CS sublayer is to converse with higher layers and
transforms upperlevel data services to MAC layer flows and associations. MAC CS has two types of sublayers:
one is ATM convergence sublayer for ATM networks & services and the other one is Packet Convergence
sublayer for packet data services for example, Ethernet, PPP, IP and VLAN (Aikaterini, 2004). The basic

function of CS Layer is that it receives data from higher layers, classifies data as ATM cell or packet and
forwards frames to CPS layer (Liu, 2004).

Figure 2: IEEE 802.16 MAC and Physical Layer (Liu, 2005)
The core part of the IEEE 802.16 MAC is the MAC CPS, which defines all methods for connection management,
bandwidth distribution, request & grant, system access procedure, uplink scheduling, connection control, and
automatic repeat request (ARQ). Communication between the CS (Convergence Sublayer) and the MAC CPS are
maintained by MAC Service Access Point (MAC SAP). Creation, modification, deletion of connection and
transportation of data over the channel are four the basic functions occuring in this communication process
(Aikaterini, 2004).
The Privacy Sublayer is accountable for the encryption and decryption of data that is coming and leaving the
Physical layer. It is also used for authentication and secure key exchange. It carries 56bit DES encryption for
traffic and 3DES encryption for key exchanges (Aikaterini, 2004). In IEEE 802.16 network, the Base Station
(BS) has 48bit base station ID, which is not a MAC address and Service Station (SS) has 48bit 802.3 MAC
address (Liu, 2005).
From a security point of view, MAC CPS (Common Part Sublayer) and MAC PS (Privacy Sublayer) have wide
responsibility. Note that in this paper MAC will refer to the MAC CPS Sublayer.
MAC Layer
The 16bit connection identifier (CID) used in MAC PDU (Protocol Data Units), functions as a reference for all
connections and is constantly granted bandwidth on demand (Eklund et al, 2002). There are two types of MAC
connection: one is Management connection and the other is Transport connection. MAC layer connections are
like TCP connections. For example the SS can have several connections to a BS for different services, like for
network management or for data transport. In MAC, all associations use different parameters for priority,
bandwidth and security. BS always assigns CID for SS. As soon as a SS joins a network, three different CIDs
are allocated to it. Moreover, each CID has separate QoS requirements, which are used by different management
connection levels: Primary (authentication and connection setup), Basic (used to transfer brief, timecritical
MAC and Radio Link control messages) and Secondary Management connections (transfer standardsbased
management messages i.e. DHCP, TFTP, and SNMP). Both basic and primary management connections are
created when a MS (Mobile station)/SS is joined to a BS network. Transport connections can be established on
demand. They are used for user traffic flows, unicast or multicast transmission. Additional channels are also
reserved by the MAC to send out uplink and downlink schedule. A single CID can carry traffic for many

different higherlayer sessions. The IEEE 802.16 MAC Layer is a stateful machine. It has series of state machines
to determine the operation of individual process within the MAC structure (Boom, 2004).
Format of MAC Messages
MAC Protocol Data Units (MPDUs) contains exchange messages of BS MAC and SS MAC. It has three parts: a
fixed length MAC header, which contains frame control information; a variablelength Payload (frame body) and
a frame check sequence (FCS), which holds IEEE 32bit CRC (Liu, 2005). Again, MAC header types are: MAC
Service Data Unit (MSPU), where payloads are MAC SDUs/segments, i.e., data from the upper layer (CS
PDUs). Second one is, Generic MAC header (GMH) where the payloads are MAC Management messages or IP
packets encapsulated in MAC CS PDUs. Both are transmitted on management connections (Liu, 2005). The
third one is Bandwidth Request Header (BRH) which is sent out without payload.
Except the Bandwidth Request PDUs, MAC PDUs may hold either MAC management messages or convergence
Sublayer data MSDU. For both GMH and MSDU, Header Type (HT bit) is always set to 0 (zero) while
Bandwidth Request Header is set to 1 (one). The MAC header contains a flag, which indicates whether the
payload of the PDU is encrypted or not (Barbeau, 2005).

Figure 3: MAC PDU Field description (Liu, 2005)
According to IEEE Standard 802.162001, MAC header and all MAC management messages are not encrypted.
This decision was made to “facilitate registration, ranging and normal operation of the MAC sublayer” as it
allows generation of false management messages. Consequently, this leads to vulnerabilities, otherwise if
encrypted, spoofing was difficult during BS and SS had exchanged encryption keys (Boom, 2004). In case of
vulnerabilities in management messages, authentication will be exposed to eavesdropping, man in the middle
attacks, active attacks and replay attacks. In the latest IEEE 802.16e standard, the payload of MAC PDUs is
encrypted with DES in the CBC mode or AES in the CCM mode (IEEE, 2006). The amended 802.16e
introduces an integrity protection mechanism for data traffic.
The EKS (Encryption Key Sequence) field is used to make sure that the BS and SS are synchronized in their use
of Traffic Encryption Keys (TEK) and Initialization Vectors (IV). When a SS joins a BS network, it follows a
multistep process. And when the SS detects an active connection it transmits its presence to BS through a Range
Request (RNGREQ) message. The SS and BS continue their conversation via RNGREQ and RNGRSP
messages using newly assigned basic CID by BS. BS replies with REGRSP message describing the supported
capabilities. SS acknowledges the REGRSP with REGACK message (Boom, 2004).
Privacy Sublayer:
Two main protocols work in this security sublayer, one is an encapsulation protocol for encrypting packet data
across the fixed BWA, and the other is a Privacy and Key Management Protocol (PKM) providing secure
distribution of keying data from BS to SS. It also enables BS to impose conditional access to network services.

The PKM protocol uses, RSA publickey algorithm, X.509 digital certificates, and strong encryption algorithm
to carry out key exchanges between SS and BS (Xu et al, 2006). This Privacy protocol is based on the PKM
protocol of the DOCSIS BPI+ specification; it has been enhanced to accommodate stronger cryptographic
methods such as AES to fit into the IEEE 802.16 MAC. (Eklund et al, 2002).
The entire security of IEEE 802.16 is in the privacy sublayer. The function of this sublayer is to provide access
control and confidentiality of the data link. Security Associations (SA) is identified by SAID, which contains,
Cryptographic suite (i.e., encryption algorithm) and Security Info (i.e., key, IV). The basic and primary
management connections do not have SAs. The secondary management connection can have an optional SA.
Transport connections always have SAs.

Figure 4: IEEE 802.16 Security Associations (SA), (Aikaterini, 2004)

Data SA (Security Associations)
Data SA has a 16bit SA identifier, a Cipher (DES in CBC mode) to protect the data during transmission over the
channel and two Traffic encryption keys (TEKs) to encrypt data: one is the current operational key and the other
is TEK. When the current key expires, TEK a 2bit key identifiers is used. A 64bit initialization vector (IV) is
used for each TEK. The lifetime of TEK is between 30 minutes to 7 days. There are three types of data SA:
Primary SA is used during link initialization, static SAs are configured on the BS and dynamic SAs are used for
transport connections when needed. The primary SA is shared between an MS and its BS. Static SAs and
dynamic SAs can be shared among several MSs (Mobile stations) during multicast. During the connection
process, SA first starts a data SA using a connection request function. A SS generally has two or three SAs, one
is the secondary management connection and one is for both uplink and downlink connections; it may use
separate SAs for uplink and downlink channels (Johnston & Walker 2004). BS ensure that each SS has access
only to SA its authorized.
Authorization SA (Authentication)
The authorization SA has a 60bit authorization key (AK) and a 4bit quantity to identify the AK. To identify SS,
it uses an X.509 certificate. The lifetime of AK ranges from 1 to 70 days, default is 7 days. Key encryption key
(KEK) has a 112bit 3DES key for distributing TEKs (Temporal encryption key) and a list of authorized data
SAs. It uses a downlink & uplink HMAC (Hash functionbased message authentication code) key providing data
authenticity of key distribution messages from the BS to SS and SS to BS respectively. An authorization SA state
is shared between a particular BS & SS. Base stations use authorization SAs to configure data SAs on the SS
(Johnston & Walker 2004).

Figure 5: IEEE 802.16 Authentications, (Wongthavarawat, 2005)
SS authentication uses X.509 certificate (Privacy Key Management (PKM) authorization protocol and
encryption) negotiate security capabilities between BS and SS, which establish security association (SAID)
through Authentication Key (AK) exchange. AK serves as authorization token, which is encrypted using public
key (RSA) cryptography. Authentication is done when both SS and BS possess AK (Wongthavarawat, 2005).
Data Key Exchange
Data encryption requires data key called Transport Encryption key (TEK), which uses AK from authentication
process to derive Key Encryption Key (KEK) and Message Authentication Key (HMAC key). TEK is generated
by BS randomly. TEK is encrypted with 3DES (use 112 bits KEK), RSA (use SS’s public key) and AES (use 128
bits KEK). Key Exchange message is authenticated by HMACSHA1, which provides Message Integrity and AK
confirmation (Wongthavarawat, 2005).

Figure 6: IEEE 802.16 IEEE 802.16 Data Key Exchange , (Wongthavarawat, 2005)

SECURITY RISKS & VULNERABILITIES
In wireless networks, confidentiality is a primary concern for secure transmission. Resistance to interception and
eavesdropping are other common threats. Message authentication is for integrity of the message and sender
authentication. Availability guarantees that the services are not prevented from access by DoS attack. Antireplay
identifies and disrepute any message that is a repeat of a past message (Xu et al, 2006).
According to Xu, Matthews and Huang (2006), there are some typical attacks on authentication protocols. One
common attack is Message replay attack on authentication and authenticated key formation protocols. They
added, “If the messages are exchanged in an authentication protocol that do not carry proper freshness
identifiers, then an opponent can easily get himself authenticated by replaying messages copied from a legitimate
authentication session”. Maninthemiddle attack usually associated in a communication protocol where
common when mutual authentication is missing. Other known attacks that are likely to occur include parallel
session attack, reflection attacks, interleaving attacks, attacks due to type flaw, attacks due to name omission,
and attacks due to misuse of cryptographic services.
Physical Layer & Privacy Sublayer
In IEEE 802.16 standard, Privacy Sublayer resides on the top of Physical layer. Therefore, 802.16 networks are
vulnerable to physical layer attacks for example, jamming and scrambling. Jamming is done by instigating a
source of strong noise to significantly lessen the capacity of the channel, thus denying services (DoS) to all
parties. However, jamming is detectable with radio analyzer devices. Scrambling is another kind of jamming,
but it takes place for a short interval of time aimed at specific frames. Control or management messages could be
scrambled, but it is not possible with delay sensitive message i.e., scrambling Uplink slots are relatively difficult,
because attacker has to interpret control information and to send noise during a particular interval (Barbeau,
2005).
The main objective of the Privacy Sublayer was to protect service providers against theft of service, rather than
guarding network users. It is noticeable that the privacy layer only guards data at the OSI layer two (data link),
whereas it does not ensure endtoend encryption of user data. Moreover, it does not protect physical layer from
being intercepted (Boom, 2004). It is necessary to include technologies to secure physical layer and higher layer
security for a converged routable network.
Identity theft is another threat, which is reprogramming a device with the hardware address of another device.
The address can be stolen over the air by intercepting management messages. A rogue BS is an attacker station
which act as a legitimate BS. It confuses a set of SSs/MSs when attempting to get service through what they
believe being a legitimate BS. It is difficult in 802.16 network because of time division multiple access (TDMA)
model. In this case, the attacker must transmit while the real BS is transmitting, with more signal strength and
place the real BS’s signal in the background, moreover attacker has to capture the identity and wait until a time
slot of legitimate BS starts (Barbeau, 2005).
In wireless world some threats are generic; IEEE 802.16 is not an exception. A classic threat arises from the
water torture attack, in which an attacker sends a series of frames to drain the receiver’s battery. In addition,
attacker with a properly positioned RF receiver can intercept messages sent through wireless, and thus a
confidentiality mechanism in the design is required. Present security mechanisms do not address well in IEEE
802.16a Mesh modes network, which lead into new security threats, such as the trustworthiness of the nexthop
mesh node. Introducing mobility in IEEE 802.16e standard will make the attacker’s life comfortable. As the
physical location of the attacker is not an issue, management messages are more vulnerable than in IEEE 802.11.
Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a secure connectivity while a mobile SS shifts between BSs (Johnston &
Walker, 2004).
With a properly configured RF transmitter, an attacker can write to a RF channel, forge new frame and capture,
mutate, and retransmit frames from authorized edge. The design must ensure a data authenticity technology. It
is also possible to resend a valid, alreadysent frame unmodified. In case of long distance transmission, radio
interference and distance could permit an attacker to reorder and selectively forward frames, in a situation where

two authorized edges are not able to contact directly with each other. Therefore, the design must detect replayed
frames (Johnston & Walker, 2004).
Mutual Authentication
Two types of certificate are classified by IEEE 802.16 standard: one is for manufacturer certificates and the other
is for SS certificates. There is no provision for BS certificates. A manufacturer certificate identifies the
manufacturer of an IEEE 802.16 device. It can be a self signed certificate or issued by a third party. A SS
certificate identifies a particular SS and includes its MAC address in the subject field. Manufacturers typically
create and sign SS certificates. In general the BS uses the manufacturer certificate’s public key to verify the SS
certificate, and hence identify the device as genuine. This design assumes that the SS maintains the private key
corresponding to its public key in a sealed storage, preventing attackers from easily compromising it. The big
flaw of the IEEE 802.16 security design is the lack of a BS certificate. The only way to defend the client against
forgery or replay attack is to provide a scheme for mutual authentication (Johnston & Walker 2004). It’s
supported by Wongthavarawat (2005), “No mutual authentication is provided, which is vulnerable to rogue BS
maninthemiddle attack and SS certification is a limited authentication method.” In 802.16e, EAP can be
actualized with specific authentication methods such as EAPTLS (X.509 certificatebased) (Barbeau, 2005).
Unclear Definitions
IEEE 802.16 design failed to explicitly define the authorization SA, for instance, state of the SA never
differentiates one authorization SA instance from another, which is vulnerable to replay attacks. This will
become a significant issue when IEEE 802.16e will facilitate mobility and roaming. Also, SS cannot identify
reused data SAs. Thus the encryption scheme is vulnerable to attack via encryption key reuse. In addition, the
authorization SA does not contain the BS identity; hence the SS cannot differentiate authorized from
unauthorized BSs. Here we can assume that, hiding it from SS prevents key management and encryption, from
protecting the SS from forgery and replay attacks. One solution against the replay vulnerability is to include a
random value generator from the BS and SS to the authorization SA. In the latest IEEE 802.16e standard, this
modification could happen. The protocols presume that no parties with different public or private key pairs are
certified to employ same MAC address, condition must be explicitly defined that all certified MAC address is
unique to avoid MAC masquerading problem (Johnston & Walker, 2004).
Data Privacy
In IEEE 802.16, it uses DES in CBC mode for data privacy. DES in CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode uses
56bit DES key (TEK) and CBCIV (Initialization Vector). CBC mode requires a random initialization vector to
secure the Scheme (RSA, 2004). Continued with previous discussion Wongthavarawat (2005) said, that CBCIV
is predictable i.e, CBCIV = [IV Parameter from TEK exchange] XOR [PHY Synchronization field] and 56 bit
key is not secure based on today’s computing and fails to provide strong data confidentiality, hence it is
vulnerable to Bruce force attack to recover the original plaintext. In addition, there is no provision for message
integrity detection, which increases the possibility of active attack. Another statement from Johnston and Walker,
(2004) “Because the SA initialization vector is constant and public for its TEK, and because the PHY
synchronization field is highly repetitive and predictable, the MPDU initialization vector is also predictable.
IEEE 802.16 provides no data authenticity.”
IEEE 802.16e adopted AESCCM using 128bit key (TEK) as a new data cipher, which ensures message integrity
check and replay protection using Packet Number (PN). Transmitter construct a unique nonce as a perpacket
encryption randomizer, guarantee uniqueness and adds data authenticity mechanism (Wongthavarawat, 2005).
Key Management
In IEEE 802.16 standard it has key management protocol problem, which is its use of TEK sequence space; it
uses sequence number to differentiate messages. The protocol recognizes each TEK with a 2 bit sequence
number, enfolding the sequence number from 3 to 0 on every fourth rekey as an issue of replay attack; if replay

works, SS could not be able to detect this. Johnston and Walker (2004) said, “Encryption reuses the TEK and
initialization vector in the encryption, exposing both the TEK and the subscriber data”
Other Vulnerabilities
In the data SA definition, an AK can last for up to 70 days, whereas a TEK lifetime can be as short as 30
minutes, allowing an attacker to interject reused TEKs. A data SA can consume up to 3,360 TEKs over the AK’s
lifetime requiring the SAID space to grow from 2 to at least 12 bits. IEEE 802.16 design means the SS must trust
that the BS always generates a new AK, which is another weakness as the BS contributes all of the bits in an AK
so that BS’s random number generator must be perfect, if biased the AK and TEKs could be exposed.
In IEEE 802.16, it does not mention that authenticating the BS to the SS allows the PKM protocol vulnerable to
forgery attack. For example SS cannot verify that any authorization messages it receives were coming from
authorized BS. The BS respond to SS using public information, so any rogue BS can create a response. As we
discussed earlier, the protocol’s failure allows participants to distinguish one instance of the protocol from
another, therefore, the authorization protocol subjects the SS to replay attacks.

CONCLUSION
The new IEEE 802.16e standard has changed several security mechanisms like, generating each perframe IV
(Initialization Vector) randomly, replaying protection using Packet Number (PN). It will use AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard) as a main encryption method and introduce a flexible authentication method based on the
Extensible Authentication Protocol i.e., EAPTLS, EAPTTLS, PEAP, EAPSIM, which extends the
authentication to AAA server. AESCCM mode is a new data link cipher for data authenticity mechanism, which
is specified by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology). The standard also, replaces TripleDES
key wrapping in the PKM protocol with the AESECB mode and facilitates low cost reauthentication during
roaming. Further research is required to find out security threats and vulnerabilities in the IEEE 802.16e
standard.
Security mechanism is an expensive process; it requires extensive level of research, performance evaluation and
implementation outcomes. The IEEE 802.16e will open the door for wireless mobility, vulnerability as well,
because there are be no constraints for an attacker. In such a situation, more issues like, BS to BS key
management, roaming user authentication & voice migration will arise. IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX) has the
capability to attain success in wireless communication arena. Though, wireless vendors have already marketed
their WiMAX product, this technology is still under development; and need more academic research and time to
achieve a maturity level. Therefore, business organization, service provider and IT professionals should take
great care before deployment of this new technology.
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